The principle of judicial independence is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law, which has been the focus of the practice of European courts for years. The system of requirements related to the constitutional principle of judicial independence is developing dynamically. This practice largely focuses on national courts, but in recent years, increasing attention has also been paid to the issue of the independence of international and EU courts. In the discourse on the issues of the independence of international judicial bodies, the comparative law approach can be a suitable and useful method.
The research team pays special attention to the analysis of the rules for the nomination and election of judges of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which, with the exception of the advisory panel under Article 255 TFEU, 255. are still primarily carried out at the Member State level, which the panel confirmed in the Valančius judgment. The research focuses on the nomination practices of several Member States and the relevant rules of other international judicial forums. In relation to the allocation of cases and the appointment of the rapporteur judge, special attention is paid to the lack of random allocation of cases and the discretionary powers of the President. The research examines the role of the Advocates General and the judicial rapporteurs, the lack of parallel reasoning and dissenting opinions and their connection with the re-election of judges.
